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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the United States is a series of constitutional 
revolutions that have defined and redefined the nation and its people.  
Constitutional revolutions occur in many ways.  They may emerge from 
expressions of popular will that manifest themselves through dialogic 
exchanges among courts, politicians, bureaucrats, social movements, and 
citizens.1  They may alternatively spring from court-centric showdowns in 
which judges give concrete meaning to ambiguous or indeterminate 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School; Yale University (J.D., B.A.); 
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to participate in the University of Detroit Mercy Law Review’s March 2011 Symposium on 
“Celebrating an Anniversary: A Twenty-Year Review of Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
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 1. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 47 (1991). 
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constitutional rules that demand clarity for adjudicating a constitutional 
controversy.2  Constitutional revolutions may also transpire in the battle to 
reconcile a nation’s founding heritage with a constitution, either written or 
unwritten, whose content constitutes the principal battleground for political 
actors.3 
But more than the constitutional revolutions themselves, it is the 
individuals behind those revolutions—the bold American constitutional 
revolutionaries—who have shaped the face of American constitutional law.  
From the founding to Reconstruction, from Jim Crow to the civil rights era, 
from the New Deal to the modern conservative resurgence, these and other 
seismic transformations in American history trace their beginnings to 
constitutional revolutionaries.  To borrow from the late Thomas Carlyle, 
the story of America is but the biography of influential Americans.4 
The protagonists—and their antagonists—in the story of America are 
familiar names.  James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and their fellow 
Federalists prevailed at the founding over the Anti-Federalist forces led by 
Patrick Henry, George Mason, and George Clinton.5  Thomas Jefferson and 
John Adams, whose constitutional clash led to momentous changes in the 
modalities of presidential selection in the early nineteenth century, are two 
other central characters in the story of America.6  So too is Abraham 
Lincoln, the peerless champion of social change, who stared down the 
leaders of the Southern Confederacy standing in the way of America’s 
constitutional renewal.7  And the constitutional visionary Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, whose four terms as president reset the balance of powers 
between the federal and state governments, also stands among the great 
revolutionaries in the annals of American history. 
Today, America stands on the edge of yet another constitutional 
revolution—one that could augur changes so colossal as to transform the 
very basis of legitimate authority in the nation.  The constitutional 
revolutionary leading this transformative movement is neither a president 
nor a legislator nor an amorphous aggregation of political interests.  It is 
instead a single, and indeed singular, individual who currently sits on the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Clarence Thomas.  His judgments 
 
 2. See ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE 
ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 159 (2000). 
 3. See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA’S SECULARISM IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 232 (2003). 
 4. Thomas Carlyle, The Hero as Divinity, in THOMAS CARLYLE’S COLLECTED WORKS 
ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 3, 34 (London, Chapman & Hall 
1840) (“The History of the world is but the Biography of great men.”). 
 5. See DAVID J. SIEMERS, RATIFYING THE REPUBLIC: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND 
FEDERALISTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2002). 
 6. See JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800 
(2004). 
 7. See HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE 
COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (2004). 
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have come to constitute the intellectual core of an indefatigable movement 
to return the United States to its founding confederate design.  That is the 
next frontier in American constitutional law. 
The United States has, of course, long shed its founding skin.  First 
conceived under the Articles of Confederation as a confederated union of 
states standing supreme above the national government,8 the United States 
is today—and indeed has been since the adoption of the United States 
Constitution—more accurately described as a federation: an arrangement of 
two levels of government in which the national government occupies the 
only starring role and the states find themselves relegated to the periphery.9  
The primacy of the center over the states is nevertheless now a lived 
reality, achieved only as a result of fiercely fought battles over 
constitutional meaning in the course of America’s coming of age. 
But there remain many chapters still to be written in the story that is 
America.  Whether the national government will retain its supremacy as a 
matter of political might and constitutional right, is equally unclear as 
whether the several states will reclaim ascendancy in the American project 
of democracy.  For that is what looms ahead: an intensifying conversation 
that may erupt into a constitutional conflict about the proper balance 
between confederation and federation, the relative competencies of national 
institutions and their sub-national counterparts, and the appropriate role of 
the federal government in local affairs.  In short, the future constitutional 
course of the United States will turn on just how compellingly citizens are 
moved by Justice Thomas’s view that it is time to turn back the 
constitutional clock to the founding. 
In these brief reflections, I shall illustrate how constitutional 
revolutions have shaped the United States by using three different 
examples of revolution leadership: legislative, presidential, and judicial.  I 
will begin, in Part I, with the adoption of the United States Constitution 
where the founding statesmen—a super-legislature of sorts—gathered in 
Philadelphia to launch a convention-centric constitutional revolution.  In 
Part II, I will turn to an example of president-centric constitutional 
revolution—the New Deal constitutional revolution led by President 
Roosevelt.  In Part III, I will return to the present day to suggest that 
America may now find itself on the cusp of another constitutional 
revolution—a modern conservative judge-centric constitutional revolution 
that could change much of what lies at the foundation of the United States 
Constitution.  Specifically, I will suggest that Clarence Thomas is a modern 
constitutional revolutionary whose vision for the United States is as 
transformative as those of Roosevelt, Lincoln, and the Federalists.  Part V 
will then offer concluding observations. 
 
 8. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II. 
 9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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I. AMERICA’S SECOND FOUNDING 
The Articles of Confederation originally governed the United States.  
Its purpose, narrow in scope, was to bring together disparate entities in the 
national interest to establish a common front against external enemies.10  
Ten years later, the American founders re-envisioned the United States as a 
union that would have a purpose much grander: to make welfare, liberty, 
and justice the aspirations for the new republic.11  True, the United States 
Constitution retained some key holdover terms from the Articles of 
Confederation,12 but there is no doubt that the Constitution ushered in an 
entirely new regime of constitutional government. 
A. The Rule of Unanimity 
Those changes in constitutional government are fascinating in and of 
themselves.  But what is perhaps more interesting is how the American 
founders pulled off this remarkable makeover from one constitutional 
structure to another.  It was a constitutional revolution.  The process by 
which the founders replaced the Articles of Confederation was a 
constitutionally irregular episode that set a new standard for political 
legitimacy in the United States by violating the then-governing 
constitutional rules.   
 
 10. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III. 
 11. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 12. For example, both charters reserved all rights not expressly delegated to the 
several states.  Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each State retains 
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which 
is not by this confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress 
assembled.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”).  Both charters also adopt the rule against holding concurrent legislative-
executive offices.  Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, § 2 (“No State 
shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor by more than seven members; and no 
person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years, in any term of six 
years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the 
United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or 
emolument of any kind.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative 
shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created . . . , during such time; and no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House 
during his Continuance in office.”).  And both ensure reciprocity and full faith and credit to 
the official acts of state officials.  Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, § 
3 (“Full faith and credit shall be given, in each of these States, to the records, acts, and 
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.”), with U.S. CONST. 
art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
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Consider that the 1787 Constitutional Convention charged with 
drafting the new United States Constitution required only a supermajority 
vote of the states to adopt the new charter.  The Convention held fast to this 
new rule despite the text of the existing—and at the time still legally 
binding—Articles of Confederation, which insisted on the unanimous 
consent of each of the states in the union.13  The new supermajority 
benchmark was a dramatically lower measure of agreement than had been 
stipulated in the constitution of the day and stood in direct conflict with the 
lawful constitutional text.  The new supermajority ratification standard was 
therefore a departure from the boundaries set by the text of the prevailing 
constitution. 
Though others may not similarly perceive America’s second founding 
as revolutionary, they have nonetheless taken note of the irregularities 
associated with the adoption of the United States Constitution.  Scholars 
have generally reached the same conclusion: that the second founding did 
not conform to the textual strictures of the Articles of Confederation.14  
This echoes objections raised on the floor of the Constitutional Convention, 
where some delegates decried that anything less than unanimous 
ratification would descend illegitimacy upon the new Constitution.15  Even 
Akhil Amar, the leading scholar defending the legality of the founding, 
acknowledges that the ratification of the United States Constitution was 
“inconsistent” with the Articles of Confederation.16  The broader point is 
worth considering: as a matter of constitutional theory, to find irregularity 
in the founding is to open the possibility to its unconstitutionality. 
But was the supermajority ratification standard really 
unconstitutional?  If the Constitutional Convention believed its actions 
would implicitly amend the Articles of Confederation to require a lower 
 
 13. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XII (“And the articles of this 
confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; 
nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration 
be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the 
legislatures of every State.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the 
Democratic Deficit in America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859, 874 (2007); Christopher Tomlins, 
Politics, Police, Past and Present: Larry Kramer’s The People Themselves, 81 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2006); Sanford Levinson, “Imposed Constitutionalism”: Some 
Reflections, 37 CONN. L. REV. 921, 924 (2005); Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About 
Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 184–85 (1998); Gerard N. Magliocca, The 
Philosopher’s Stone: Dualist Democracy and the Jury, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 175, 185 (1998); 
Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501, 528 n.185 (1994); James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1037, 1057–58; Richard B. Bernstein, 
Charting the Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1586 (1987). 
 15. See George Anastaplo, Constitutionalism, The Rule of Rules: Explorations, 39 
BRANDEIS L.J. 17, 24–25 (2001). 
 16. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047 (1988). 
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measure of consent—from thirteen to nine states—then one could perhaps 
craft a persuasive argument that the new standard was not in fact 
unconstitutional.  On this theory, the founders, in amending the existing 
constitution according to terms that depart from those inscribed in its text, 
were implicitly repealing, revising, and enshrining new requirements for 
subsequent amendments to the constitution.  This possible interpretation is 
not entirely implausible, nor is it inconsistent with the novelty of the 
founders’ vision.  They were simultaneously taking and giving a course in 
introductory constitutionalism.  Written constitutions, the process of textual 
amendment, and the distinction between formal and informal amendments 
to a written constitution were brand new ideas at the time.17  In light of this, 
it may be unreasonable to hold the American founders of the eighteenth 
century to our contemporary models of constitutionalism. 
Perhaps the theory of implied amendment can help us defend the 
actions of the framers.  If we can find supporting evidence from prior 
constitutional practice suggesting that political actors could indeed amend 
the Articles of Confederation with methods as unconventional as the ones 
the  founders deployed, then we can more persuasively negate the argument 
that the founding was constitutionally irregular or extraordinary and, 
therefore, revolutionary.  To find such evidence, we might probe successful 
efforts to amend the Articles of Confederation—attempts that were 
successful at the time despite achieving less than the unanimous consent of 
the states. 
Can we discern from early American political practice any suggestion 
that the Articles of Confederation were amenable to amendment in this 
unconventional way?  The answer appears to be no.  Consider that in 1783, 
only four years prior to the Constitutional Convention, Congress had 
proposed to amend the Articles of Confederation to confer upon itself the 
power to tax states based on their populations instead of land values.18  The 
amendment failed because it had fallen short of receiving unanimous 
support from the states.19  But that is not our only evidence.  Perhaps most 
telling of all is that Rhode Island, the smallest of all state signatories to the 
Articles of Confederation, had often blocked amendments that had 
otherwise mustered the impressive, but on its  own insufficient, backing of 
each of the other twelve colonies.20 
 
 17. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1457, 1457–58 (2001). 
 18. Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of 
the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 87 (1998). 
 19. Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the 
Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 437–38 (1999). 
 20. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE 
THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 11–12 (1993); Dan 
T. Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist and Its Impact on 
Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 483 (2006); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The 
Uneasy Case for Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85 IOWA L. REV. 907, 914–15 
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The rule of unanimity, then, was not just for show.  It was a very real 
constraint on political actors who wished to rewrite the rules of government 
in the republic—a constraint that the founders nevertheless found a way to 
circumvent by using revolutionary means to transform the American 
confederation into the United States.  Indeed, had the Articles of 
Confederation been lawfully susceptible to amendment by anything less 
than unanimous consent, there would have been no reason for the founders 
to bother with the charade of seeking ratification by the states and their 
respective citizens.  It would have been sufficient to secure the approval of 
a supermajority—or even a simple majority—of states as represented by 
their legislators.  Indeed, even that would have been going above and 
beyond because the Constitutional Convention could have simply amended 
the Articles of Confederation instead of adopting an altogether new 
constitutional text for the United States.21 
B. Popular Authority 
This raises a critical point: where did the founders draw the authority 
to cast aside the binding amendment rules specified in the Articles of 
Confederation?  They drew it from an authority even higher than the 
constitutional text: from the people themselves.22  The founding was, in the 
moving words of Tomlins, no less than “a sacred act—an act of universal 
jurisdiction—at a Messianic moment.”23  It signaled the inception of a 
lasting convergence of popular will, natural law, and sovereign expression 
of self-definition.  For James Madison, the Articles of Confederation were 
no more than a soluble treaty among several independent states, each of 
which retained sovereignty as distinct governmental entities.  In contrast, 
the ratification of the United States Constitution was an act of civic 
sovereignty indicating the consent of citizens across the land, not 
necessarily tethered to a state affiliation, to renounce the Articles of 
Confederation.24 
No existing law, no convention of political practice, nor even the 
legally binding constitutional text could trump this new rule of popular 
sovereignty.  A fuller conception of democracy, represented here by active 
engagement in constitutional affairs of the new state, could therefore 
 
(2000); Brendon Troy Ishikawa, Toward a More Perfect Union: The Role of Amending 
Formulae in the United States, Canadian, and German Constitutional Experiences, 2 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 267, 272–73 (1996). 
 21. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF 
NATIONAL POWER 18–19 (2nd ed. 2008). 
 22. Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2121, 
2125–26 (1996). 
 23. Christopher Tomlins, The Threepenny Constitution (and the Question of Justice), 
58 ALA. L. REV. 979, 989 (2007). 
 24. Patrick M. O’Neil, The Declaration as Ur-Constitution: The Bizarre 
Jurisprudential Philosophy of Professor Harry V. Jaffa, 28 AKRON L. REV. 237, 240–41 
(1995). 
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justifiably override the constitutional pre-commitments of the Articles of 
Confederation.25  And never mind whether the founders had exceeded their 
authority in breaking with the rule of unanimity required by the Articles of 
Confederation.  For the federalist advocates of the new charter, there were 
loftier principles hanging in the balance, namely infusing natural law into 
the terms of the refashioned state.26  The ends clearly justified the means 
according to the founders.  Their singular devotion to the revolutionary 
idea of a new republic could repair any supposed procedural misdeeds in 
dodging the stubborn rule of unanimity: 
[T]he charge against the Convention of exceeding their powers, 
except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no 
foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers, 
they were not only warranted but required, as the confidential 
servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they 
were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assumed, and that 
finally, if they had violated both their powers, and their 
obligations in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to 
be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and 
happiness of the people of America.27 
The Constitutional Convention recognized the irregularity of its own 
actions.  Madison himself admitted that the Convention had defied the 
Articles of Confederation by spurning the rule of unanimity.28  The 
delegates to the Convention consequently took measured steps to legitimize 
the unconstitutionality of their now supermajority ratification standard, 
opting to present their vision for a new state to their fellow citizens through 
the states as intermediaries rather than going directly to the people in a 
national referendum.29  This strategy allowed them to keep the states 
involved as partners in the project of erecting a new constitutional 
democracy.  Skirting the states would have surely alienated them because 
the states still regarded themselves as principals and the national actors as 
their agents, a view still then very much consistent with the Articles of 
Confederation. 
Over two centuries later, the supermajority ratification standard 
continues to shape the practice and politics of constitutional change in the 
United States.  It is now the core of Article V of the United States 
 
 25. See Larry D. Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343, 1347 
n.21 (2005). 
 26. See Charles R. Kesler, Natural Law and a Limited Constitution, 4 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 549, 554–57 (1995). 
 27. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 267 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 28. See id. at 263 (stating that “[i]nstead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation 
of the Legislatures of all the States, they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by 
the people, and may be carried into effect by nine States only.”). 
 29. Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 191, 226 (1995). 
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Constitution, which specifies the textual rules for amending the 
Constitution.30  The inspired choice of the Constitutional Convention to 
seek the approbation of the people through their state legislatures turned 
out to be more than a political strategy designed to palliate concerns about 
the centralizing tendencies of the new state.  That it was a stroke of 
political genius is beyond dispute, if only because it held together the 
former British colonies and fused them into one nascent republic.  But even 
beyond its political expediency, the supermajority ratification standard has 
been conferred a special status, becoming a constitutional precedent that 
remains in full force and effect to this day through the text and spirit of 
Article V.31  Enshrined in the United States Constitution since its first use 
in 1787, this revolutionary supermajority rule now sets the hurdle that 
subsequent amendments to the constitution must successfully clear in order 
to become inscribed in the constitutional text. 
This brings us full circle to where we began: the locus of legitimacy in 
the founding of a new constitutional order.  When constitutional creators 
use irregular procedures to found a new state, the successful establishment 
of the state breathes legitimacy, both into the creators as proven masters of 
statecraft and into their irregular procedures as tools of institutional design. 
Founding a new state out of the ashes of a former regime resets the bases of 
statehood and citizenship and establishes new terms of reference for the 
future course of the state.  That was both the intent and the consequence of 
the founders’ constitutional revolution to re-found the United States. 
II. THE NEW DEAL TRANSFORMATION 
Just as a legislative assembly may trigger constitutional revolutions, 
so too may presidents.  We have seen a number of president-centric 
constitutional revolutions in American constitutional history.  From 
Thomas Jefferson’s transformation of the presidency32 to Andrew 
Jackson’s entrenchment of tricameralism33 and to Abraham Lincoln’s 
renewal of America,34 presidents have occupied a starring role in the story 
of American constitutionalism. 
A. The Balance of Powers 
Perhaps the leading example of a president-centric constitutional 
revolution was Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal Revolution.  In a 
 
 30. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 31. U.S. CONST. ART. V. 
 32. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, 
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005). 
 33. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 
78 NEB. L. REV. 205 (1999). 
 34. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1991). 
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battle over the power of the central government to regulate the economy in 
the larger national interest, Roosevelt faced a Supreme Court resolved to 
stand in his way.  We know now that this storied chapter in American 
history ends with a presidential victory vindicating national powers over 
state rights.  But the triumph did not come easily, nor was it assured to 
begin with.  It took presidential leadership—revolutionary presidential 
leadership—to transform the orientation of the Constitution from provincial 
to national. 
The New Deal Revolution is well documented by constitutional 
historians and theorists.35  But perhaps the best account of the revolutionary 
roots of the New Deal is Bruce Ackerman’s rich study of constitutional 
change, which marries constitutional law and politics with political 
philosophy and history.36  Ackerman makes the compelling case that the 
New Deal was revolutionary along at least two dimensions: procedurally 
and substantively.  As a matter of procedure, argues Ackerman, the New 
Deal model of presidential leadership deployed in tandem with 
transformative judicial opinions effectively amended the United States 
Constitution, albeit without memorializing those changes in the form of a 
written constitutional amendment.37  As a matter of constitutional law and 
politics, the New Deal changed the relationship between the center and the 
periphery, legitimizing an activist national regulatory state and repudiating 
the free-market economics that had until then given wide latitude to 
states.38  On both counts, the New Deal proved transformative, and it all 
began with Roosevelt who, for Ackerman, was “the founder of the modern 
activist state.”39 
B. The Supremacy of the Center 
What exactly does it mean to describe the national government as an 
activist institution?  In the context of the federal politics of the New Deal, it 
refers to the way the national government used its enhanced regulatory 
powers.  More power in the hands of the national government—which was 
the outcome of the New Deal—reset the balance of powers between the 
national government and the states, and in so doing fundamentally rewrote 
 
 35. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); see also THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST 
ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 
(2004); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional 
Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845 (1996); Steven 
G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United 
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995). 
 36. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
 37. Id. at 271. 
 38. See id. at 11, 27, 284, 335, 353. 
 39. Id. at 279. 
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the old rules of federalism.40  Whereas it may have been accurate in an 
earlier time to conceive of public authority in the United States flowing 
from the states to the center, the opposite became true under Roosevelt’s 
leadership.  The New Deal concentrated power in the hands of the national 
government, and the states, which had once been “separate and sovereign,” 
ultimately became “subordinate and inferior.”41 
Activist, then, is the right term to describe the posture taken by the 
national government—with the acquiescence of the judiciary—in its 
interaction with the states during the New Deal era.  The dominance of the 
national government manifested itself in three different ways, which Cass 
Sunstein identifies as the three categories of substantial changes the New 
Deal introduced to American constitutional structure: first, the national 
government saw a dramatic expansion in its power, almost to something 
approximating a general police power; second, the national government 
also took greater permissions in pursuing redistributionist policies in the 
interest of individual rights as opposed to purely private interests; and third, 
the executive branch acquired new authority—authority that was, 
importantly, not particularly tightly constrained by the separation of 
powers—by way of administrative agencies.42 
History teaches us that the New Deal was wildly successful, both in 
terms of policy and public relations.  So much so that by the end of the 
1970s and early 1980s—nearly half a century after the New Deal—one 
could reasonably claim that “[t]he New Deal has become so much a part of 
the American Way that no political party that aspires to office even dreams 
of repudiating it.”43  Today, however, though we are not that far removed 
from the height of enthusiasm for the New Deal, that conventional wisdom 
no longer rings true.44  No more is public reverence for the New Deal a 
requirement—as it once virtually was—for holding elected office in the 
United States.  Nor does appointed office, including even judicial office, 
demand a similar fealty to the New Deal.  Quite the contrary, pledging 
allegiance today to the New Deal is in some corners of the country the first 
step toward political death.  Many politicians and political parties now 
proudly ride to victory on pledges of repudiating the New Deal.45 
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There are many reasons why the present may be more equivocal than 
the past about the New Deal.  Times may have changed.  Social 
expectations may have recalibrated to a new standard.  Political tastes may 
have evolved.  All of those may be true and help explain why the New Deal 
no longer stands at the summit of American political achievement.  But 
there is more to it than those three items. 
The decline of the New Deal Revolution corresponds with the rise of 
powerful ideas that have spawned a counterrevolutionary movement 
exhibiting all of the elements of a new constitutional revolution.  The new 
revolutionary movement is armed with a constitutional vision, an 
interpretive technique to explain and justify it, as well as new leaders to 
vindicate the new paradigm.  The last of these is often the most important 
because as with all constitutional revolutions, the individuals themselves 
may sometimes matter just as much as the ideas.   
In the battle to begin the New Deal counterrevolution, one leader has 
been especially adamant in his intellectual opposition to the principles that 
underpin the New Deal.  And his impassioned opposition to the New Deal 
illuminates for us the third possible incarnation of constitutional revolution: 
a judge-centric constitutional transformation. 
III. RECLAIMING CONFEDERATION 
The Supreme Court of the United States has had many constitutional 
revolutionaries on its bench.  From John Marshall’s transformative rulings 
in the early years of the American republic46 to Earl Warren’s touchstone 
judgments for progressive constitutionalism,47 the Court has been pulled in 
new directions by legal giants who have had in mind a purpose much larger 
than simply deciding the matter at hand.  These constitutional 
revolutionaries have seen their role as smoothing the constitutional terrain 
for extraordinary changes in the interpretation or application of the 
Constitution, all in the service of an unconventional, irregular or contrarian 
vision of American constitutionalism.  Today, there sits yet another 
constitutional revolutionary on the Supreme Court: Clarence Thomas. 
Justice Thomas is an ardent federalist who has made it his judicial 
mission to stand as a sentinel for state sovereignty.  Yet, it would be wrong 
to call Justice Thomas a mere federalist and to leave it at that because he is 
a very peculiar type of federalist: he is a confederalist.48  We can trace the 
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intellectual lineage of confederalists to John Calhoun, a former secessionist 
Senator from South Carolina, and before him to the Anti-Federalists of the 
founding era.49  But let us be careful not to ascribe to Justice Thomas the 
nullificationist sympathies of Calhoun because there is no evidence to 
make any such suggestion.50  Nor may we claim that Justice Thomas today 
accepts the validity of the Articles of Confederation or even longs for a 
return to those days.  Quite the contrary, to make that claim would be to 
ignore the very basis for Justice Thomas’s judicial decision making: the 
original intent of the United States Constitution’s drafters and ratifiers, who 
certainly meant to repudiate much of the Articles of Confederation.51  
Notwithstanding these important qualifications to affixing the confederalist 
label to Justice Thomas, the designation nonetheless proves useful in 
examining his constitutional theory because Justice Thomas does indeed 
hold confederalist, not simply federalist, views.  To understand why this 
distinction matters, we need to probe the difference between a federation 
and a confederation, for that is where the seeds may lay for the next 
constitutional revolution. 
Under prevailing theories of constitutional government, the difference 
between federation and confederation turns on the locus of sovereignty.  
Federations are created pursuant to the consent of the people of the entire 
nation, whereas confederations form on the agreement of several sovereign 
subnational entities.52  In the former, the seat of sovereignty is the people 
constituted as a national organism, whereas in the latter, sovereignty sits in 
the states, which have delegated bounded authority to a central government 
they have created to discharge limited purposes.53  We can therefore think 
of a federation as a nation-centric vision of federalism that acknowledges, 
and indeed invites, the centripetal force and moral claim of centralization.  
In contrast, a confederation is a state-centric conception that is more 
sympathetic to the centrifugal forces that serve as an embankment to the 
tide of centralization. 
Confederalist theory is defined by three principles: state supremacy, 
state sovereignty, and suspicion of the center.  A word on each of these is 
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appropriate and useful.  First, confederalists regard the sub-national entities 
as supreme in the two-tier arrangement of government with power flowing 
from states as separate and sovereign bodies down to the central 
government.  Second, confederalists reject incursions by the national 
government into the sovereign empire of the states, which for them is 
inviolable.  Third, confederalists are typically distrustful of the central 
government and unusually attentive to the aggrandizing designs of national 
institutions within the federal system.  State supremacy, state sovereignty, 
and suspicion of the center—these are the three signposts of confederalist 
theory.  Justice Thomas is correctly described as a confederalist because his 
revolutionary view of federalism echoes each of them. 
A. Dual Sovereignties 
Since Justice Thomas’s confirmation to the Supreme Court, each of 
these three signposts of confederalist theory has moved closer from 
aspiration to reality.  The result of the Court’s deeper embrace of 
confederalist principles has been increasingly to define the United States 
and the several states as dual sovereignties.  To be clear though, Justice 
Thomas has not actually been the face of the Court’s revival of states’ 
rights; quite the contrary, the renaissance of a robust vision of federalism 
began to take shape under Ronald Reagan’s conservative appointments to 
the Supreme Court and the rise of more aggressive conservative public 
interest litigation efforts.54  For his part, Justice Thomas has often been a 
dissenting or concurring voice in the most important federalism judgments 
during this modern era.  But one can lead without being the general.  And 
that is precisely what Justice Thomas has done.  He has been the 
intellectual force behind the confederalist movement.  This is evident in his 
opinions on each of the three signposts of confederalist theory: state 
supremacy, state sovereignty, and suspicion of the center. 
Begin with state supremacy, which is perhaps the definitive pillar of 
confederalist theory.  For confederalists, the concept of state supremacy 
means that the national government is derivative of the states.  Under a 
confederalist reading of American history, the several states collectively 
consented to the creation of the national government and delegated to it 
provisional and constrained authority.  Confederalists anchor their theory in 
two loci: first, in the Tenth Amendment; and second, in the very nature of 
the written Constitution.  The text of the Tenth Amendment states that 
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”55  For confederalists, it is no mystery why the Tenth 
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Amendment echoes Article II of the Articles of Confederation,56 which 
similarly conferred residual and reserve powers to the states: it marks an 
intentional continuity between the Articles to the Constitution, a clearly 
discernible intent to elevate the periphery above the center. 
For confederalists, the concept of state supremacy is most compelling 
when the Tenth Amendment is weighed in tandem with the discrete, 
definitive, limited, and enumerated quality of the national government’s 
powers as specified in the Constitution.  That the framers would state with 
such specificity the powers of the national government—for instance the 
powers to “fix the Standard of Weights and Measures”57 or to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts”58—suggests to confederalists that they 
considered, only to decline, conferring other and also greater powers upon 
the national government. 
We can perceive Justice Thomas’s confederalist orientation by 
examining his view of the Tenth Amendment.  Any discussion of Justice 
Thomas’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment must begin with his 
dissenting opinion in U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton, a 5-4 decision in 
which the majority invalidated a state constitutional amendment, duly 
adopted by Arkansas voters, imposing term limits on candidates for 
Congress.59  Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and 
Scalia, Justice Thomas unveiled a nuanced interpretation of federalism.  
“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority,” wrote Justice 
Thomas, “is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the 
consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”60  What 
Justice Thomas was gesturing toward in this passage is the Tenth 
Amendment.  As discussed further below, for Justice Thomas, the Tenth 
Amendment means that the states and their respective people hold reserve 
powers, but it does not tell us in any way whether those reserve powers rest 
with either the states or the citizens.61 
This is a profoundly sophisticated, if unconventional, theory of 
constitutional authority.  It could appeal to those who proclaim popular 
sovereignty as their battle cry just as it could appeal to federalists.  Indeed, 
these may not be mutually exclusive groups.  Nevertheless, Justice 
Thomas’s constitutional theory has not yet gathered many adherents 
beyond the most conservative Supreme Court observers.  For what sits at 
the core of Justice Thomas’s theory of constitutional authority and political 
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legitimacy is the very confederalist terms that the Anti-Federalists of the 
founding era adopted as their watchwords: state supremacy.  This is evident 
in two ways.  First, Justice Thomas conceives of the Constitution as 
devolving powers upon the center from the states.62  Justice Thomas rejects 
the view that authority flows from the national government to the states—
that the national government stands prior to or indeed enjoys primacy over 
the states—and affirms that “[t]he Constitution derives its authority instead 
from the consent of the people of the States.”63 
Second, Justice Thomas sees all reserved powers as remaining in the 
hands of either the state or its citizens, with the choice to be determined 
according to state political processes.64  Therefore, for Justice Thomas, 
each state must come to its own indigenous answer as to with whom each 
reserved power rests: “The Federal Constitution does not specify which of 
these two possibilities obtains; it is up to the various state constitutions to 
declare which powers the people of each State have delegated to their state 
government.”65  If one holds this confederalist interpretation of the 
Constitution—with the Tenth Amendment as its flagstaff—the only 
reasonable decision in U.S. Term Limits was the one Justice Thomas 
reached: that Arkansas voters have the right to impose eligibility 
requirements on their congressional candidates precisely because the 
Constitution is silent on the issue.66  And where the text is silent, the matter 
is reserved for resolution in the political process by the states and their 
people under the Tenth Amendment.67 
There are other data points on this score.  An equally instructive 
illustration of Justice Thomas’s confederalist inclination appears in his 
concurrence in Printz,68 a controversial case in which the Supreme Court 
invalidated a congressional mandate requiring the Attorney General to 
command local law enforcement officers to discharge certain executive and 
administrative tasks.69  Although Justice Thomas joined the Court’s 
majority opinion with no reservation as to any of its parts, he felt 
compelled to write separately to stress what he regarded as a critical point 
on the limited nature of the national government.70  Justice Thomas began 
his concurrence wishing to “emphasize that the Tenth Amendment affirms 
the undeniable notion that under our Constitution, the Federal Government 
is one of enumerated, hence limited, powers . . . . Accordingly, the Federal 
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Government may act only where the Constitution authorizes it to do so.”71  
He added, for emphasis anew, that “[t]he Constitution, in addition to 
delegating certain enumerated powers to Congress, places whole areas 
outside the reach of Congress’ regulatory authority.”72  He concluded with 
what he really wanted readers to take away from his concurrence—that the 
best way to interpret the Constitution was to return to the founding 
conception of statehood and the allocation of powers: “we must,” he 
insisted, “return to an interpretation better rooted in the . . . [Constitution’s] 
original understanding.”73  The strategy of invoking the original 
understanding of the Constitution serves the purpose of confederalism 
because the founding design may be plausibly, though certainly not 
definitively, described as regarding the states and the center as dual 
sovereigns. 
There is a deep interconnection between originalism and 
confederalism.  All originalists are not confederalists, but all confederalists 
are likely to be originalists.  Here is why: the founding design of the United 
States Constitution exhibited many confederalist features, perhaps most 
notably in the language of Article I (which circumscribes the powers of 
Congress74), Article V (which grants a central role to the states in amending 
the Constitution75), and in the Tenth Amendment.76  There are also several 
clauses in the text of the Constitution that highlight the significant power 
states retained when they ratified the Constitution: the power of state 
legislatures to appoint their chosen representatives to the United States 
Senate,77 the Full Faith and Credit Clause,78 and of course the Ratification 
Clause without which the Constitution never would have come into force.79 
But that is only one side of the story.  The Constitution cannot be said 
conclusively to have endorsed the notion of state supremacy to which 
confederalists ascribe; the Supremacy Clause extinguishes that 
possibility.80  What further supports a nationalist reading of the 
Constitution is that the text requires a state to obtain congressional consent 
before taking certain steps, which weakens the claim that all power derives 
from states.  For instance, a state must secure approval from Congress 
before laying duties on imports or exports,81 keeping troops in time of 
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peace,82 or entering into an agreement with another state.83  The 
Constitution also imposes outright prohibitions on actions states may wish 
to take, namely entering into treaties,84 coining money,85 or passing certain 
kinds of laws.86  The first confederalist signpost—state supremacy—is 
therefore not at its strongest from an originalist perspective.  But the same 
is not true of the second signpost of confederalism: state sovereignty. 
For confederalists like Justice Thomas, originalist interpretative 
techniques lead to outcomes supporting state sovereignty.  Confederalists 
understand sovereignty in terms of dominion over a bounded territory, here 
a state, which they believe ought to remain free from incursions by other 
entities unless those entities are invited to exercise their powers within the 
state or are endowed with superseding claims of authority.  Absent those 
types of conditions, a state remains sovereign over its own empire and 
cannot have rules or obligations that undermine its territorially-bounded 
authority foisted upon it.  That, for confederalists, is the meaning of state 
sovereignty.  And it is precisely what, according to confederalists like 
Justice Thomas, the incorporation doctrine—an innovation of national 
courts—has improperly reversed.87 
At the founding, the Bill of Rights did not constrain the actions of the 
states.  The Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.  Indeed, 
in an early nineteenth-century Supreme Court case, one of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s final opinions, the Court left no doubt about the states’ 
immunity to the commands of the Bill of Rights: “These amendments [in 
the Bill of Rights] contain no expression indicating an intention to apply 
them to the state governments.  This court cannot so apply them.”88  As 
separate sovereigns, states stood impervious to the invasive requirements of 
the Bill of Rights compelling public actors to comply with an extensive 
menu of rights and liberties.89  The Court interpreted those rights and 
liberties as obliging only federal public actors, not state public actors, on 
the theory that the sovereign states, which had created the national 
government, had chosen expressly to apply the Bill of Rights only to those 
national institutions.90  As architects of the national government, the states 
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imposed duties upon it and reserved for themselves wide latitude to 
manifest their sovereignty within their own borders.91 
This rule of state sovereignty survived for many years into the life of 
the new republic.  Nearly a century after the adoption of the Constitution, 
in 1875 the Supreme Court confirmed that the Bill of Rights “was not 
intended to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their 
own citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone.”92  Later 
in 1884, the Court applied the theory of state sovereignty to refuse to hold 
that states were required to abide by the same criminal defense provisions 
in the Bill of Rights that the national government must respect.93  Still later 
in 1886, the Court again affirmed this rule, declaring that the Bill of Rights 
“is a limitation only upon the power of congress and the national 
government, and not upon that of the state.”94 
But things began to change at the dawn of the twentieth century.  The 
Supreme Court began slowly to relegate the notion of state sovereignty to 
secondary importance behind its increasingly heightened solicitude for 
individual rights and liberties.  Deploying an interpretive device that has 
come to be known as the incorporation doctrine—pursuant to which courts 
apply the rigors of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment—the Court took a more active role in protecting rights and 
liberties against incursions by state governments.  Once the Court issued its 
first ruling incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states,95 it was only a 
matter of time before other similar cases followed.  And so it began.  Over 
the next few years, the Court issued at a rapid pace a number of judgments 
that have left only few provisions of the Bill of Rights not yet interpreted as 
restricting what states can do.96 
The confederalist position rejects this kind of national intrusion upon 
state sovereignty.  If states are sovereign—and, for confederalists, they 
are—how can states, without their express consent, fall subject to national 
standards that compromise their sovereignty?  Confederalists raise two 
principal objections to the rise of the incorporation doctrine, the first being 
procedural and the second substantive.  As to the first, for confederalists, 
the incorporation doctrine suffers from a debilitating and delegitimizing 
procedural weakness insofar as it has been imposed by the judiciary and 
has not been adopted willingly by the states and their citizens.  Second, 
confederalists simply do not agree with the principle behind incorporation: 
that states can ever be subject to foreign rules that change the relationship 
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between citizens and their state government without an express sanction, by 
the state and its people, of that changed relationship.  For confederalists, 
this does more than weaken the signpost of state sovereignty; it eviscerates 
it. 
It should therefore come as little surprise that Justice Thomas 
questions the correctness of the incorporation doctrine.97  This is most 
clearly discernible in Justice Thomas’s opinions concerning the 
Establishment Clause,98 which he believes should not apply against the 
states, contrary to the Court’s earlier, and still binding, Establishment 
Clause ruling in 1947.99  For Justice Thomas, the debate over the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights is about neither rights nor liberties but 
more squarely about federalism and the nature of the relationship between 
the center and the periphery.  The debate, for him, is not about the 
legitimacy of the Bill of Rights; it is about the legitimacy of the 
incorporation doctrine.  He views incorporation as a development that has 
in many respects improperly shrunk the sphere of autonomy of states and 
forced historically unsupported obligations upon them.  All of which, from 
the perspective of confederalists like Justice Thomas who believe deeply in 
state sovereignty, combines to chip away at incorporation’s moral force of 
reason. 
In addition to the twin confederalist signposts of state supremacy and 
state sovereignty, what likewise characterizes confederalist theory is a 
sharp suspicion of the center.  To be suspicious of the center is to fear the 
great vortex of the national government, which seems to gather increasing 
size and power over time.  Once the nationalizing trend of consolidation 
takes hold, it is very difficult to stop.  The Anti-Federalists knew well this 
lesson and tried mightily to spread their gospel.  “There is no way, 
therefore,” wrote Brutus, “of avoiding the destruction of the state 
governments, whenever the Congress please to do it,” cautioning that it was 
critical to “restrain” the national government.100  The Anti-Federalists even 
articulated fears that the Constitution would “subvert and abolish all the 
powers of the state government.”101  This was quite clearly a dubious vision 
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of the new national charter and its new national institutions.  The Anti-
Federalists moreover worried that the states would “soon dwindle into 
insignificance” because of federal encroachments.102 
To make eminently clear the Anti-Federalists’ distrust of the national 
government, Brutus stressed the point even further, making two pointed 
remarks.  First, he lamented that the Constitution would ultimately gut the 
states of their powers and prerogatives because it had been “calculated to 
abolish entirely the state governments, and to melt down the states into one 
entire government, for every purpose as well internal and local, as external 
and national.”103  In his second volley, which followed directly from his 
first, Brutus answered how the Constitution itself could accomplish that 
sinister objective: with the complicity of courts.104  Courts, he predicted, 
would gradually expand the scope of national powers and simultaneously 
contract the range of state authority: “Perhaps nothing could have been 
better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state governments than the 
constitution of the judicial.  They will be able to extend the limits of the 
general government gradually, and by insensible degrees, and to 
accommodate themselves to the temper of the people.”105 
But the Anti-Federalists’ advocacy had little effect at the time.  They 
lost the founding battle when the Constitution was duly ratified by the ninth 
state.  Worse still from the contemporary confederalist perspective, the 
Anti-Federalists may still yet lose the larger war.  Indeed, the modern 
Supreme Court appears to have managed to accomplish precisely what the 
Anti-Federalists foretold, pinching down on the powers of the states 
relative to the national government and multiplying the powers of the 
center over the periphery.  Proof positive, for confederalists, is the Supreme 
Court’s prevailing interpretation of the Commerce Clause. 
Confederalists have had some meaningful victories in the unfolding of 
the Commerce Clause’s interpretation.  In their pre-New Deal heyday, 
confederalists applauded the Supreme Court for carving out and then 
vigorously defending an inviolable sanctuary for states.  Cases like United 
States v. E.C. Knight Co.,106 Hammer v. Dagenhart,107 A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States,108 United States v. Butler,109 Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co.,110 and Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement 
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District111 vindicated states and their sovereignty and held at bay the 
aggrandizing designs of the national government.  But those victories did 
not last.  The New Deal heralded what was, for confederalists, a troubling 
era of judicial decisions that made real the Anti-Federalists’ founding fears 
about courts gradually extending the reach of the national government into 
the domain of the states.  Those New Deal decisions and others are well 
known in the pantheon of progressive constitutional law: National Labor 
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,112 United States v. 
Darby,113 Wickard v. Filburn,114 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,115 
and Katzenbach v. McClung.116  Those cases were great victories for the 
New Deal and Civil Rights eras.  But they were significant setbacks for 
confederalists. 
Today, though, the tide may be turning back to something more 
closely resembling the pre-New Deal era.  Beginning in the 1990s, the 
Supreme Court, possessed of a majority of Republican appointees, issued 
judgments that were more deferential to state sovereignty than the Court 
had been in its recent past.  The Court invalidated congressional action as 
violative of the Commerce Clause as it began more emphatically to assert 
limits on what Congress could do in relation to states and their 
governments.  It appeared to many that the Court had resolved to affix 
constitutional handcuffs on Congress.  United States v. Lopez,117 Printz v. 
United States,118 United States v. Morrison,119 New York v. United States,120 
Alden v. Maine,121 and other cases gave court watchers all the proof they 
needed to conclude that they were witnessing the genesis of a conservative 
revolution in the name of federalism.122  Yet, more than breathing new life 
into federalism, these cases can be seen as beginning to rebuild the barriers 
that once separated the center from the periphery and as slowly pulling the 
Republic back to an era when states operated as separate sovereigns.  
Justice Thomas joined the majority in each of these cases. 
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B. The Seeds of Conservative Revolution 
Justice Thomas has long been a champion of confederalist principles.  
Even before his appointment to the Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas, 
then-Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
intimated his great reverence for the decentralized federalism of the 
founding era.  Urging that the United States Constitution be interpreted in 
light of the Declaration of Independence, Justice Thomas argued that 
institutional design was critical to the entrenchment of American values, 
perhaps foremost among these being, for him, liberty: “the problem is not 
replacing good intentions with good institutions but rather having good 
institutions that protect and reinforce good intentions.”123  According to 
Justice Thomas, federalism is one such good institution, that which makes 
possible the virtues of civil society and of individuals themselves. 
For Justice Thomas, the apex of a good public institutional design of 
federalism is confederation.  It is, in his view, the best institutional form of 
federalism for the United States.  What makes it his first choice is not 
necessarily that it is normatively more appealing than a more centralized 
form of federalism but, rather, that it more closely approximates what he 
interprets to be the founding design.  That—the founding design and its 
animating principles—is what impels Justice Thomas to decide cases the 
way he does.  He holds an abiding fidelity to the Constitution’s text and its 
origins, and only the very rarest of modernity’s intervening changes should, 
to his mind, compromise the way we apply that text of old to today.  
Therein lie the seeds of the conservative revolution he stands closer than 
ever before to sewing. 
The next constitutional revolution has been underway for years.124  
The mission of the conservative revolution has remained unchanged since 
its beginnings when Ronald Reagan took office as president.  It is to stand 
on the pillars of federalism, limited government, and enumerated national 
powers to undo much of the New Deal’s expansion of the central 
government.125  It is also, by implication, to return to the several states the 
powers they once enjoyed under a judicial regime that did not interpret the 
congressional commerce power as a repository of nearly infinite legislative 
authority.  All of which, it should be noted, is what Justice Thomas already 
believes is correct as a matter of constitutional law and history. 
But the conservative constitutional movement has never quite yet 
evolved into a real revolution, at least not one that has been consummated.  
Having on more than one occasion reached points very close to revolution, 
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the movement has been short-circuited, though not irremediably so, in the 
face of spirited counterforces mobilizing successfully to slow it down.  In 
the words of Linda Greenhouse, the conservative movement has been 
“fitful” without fail, finding ways to stall itself at the inopportune moments 
when decisive victory appeared possible.126  There have been at least two 
such occasions since the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency. 
One of the first moments that disrupted the rising conservative 
constitutional movement is forever memorialized by a new verb in the 
lexicon of American constitutional politics: “bork” as in “to be borked.”  
Being “borked” is a reference to the giant conservative legal scholar, 
Robert Bork, whom Reagan had nominated to the Supreme Court in 1986, 
only to see the Senate reject his candidacy by a margin of 58-42.127  For 
conservatives who believe that Bork was eminently qualified to be a 
Supreme Court justice, a candidate is “borked” when she is unfairly 
rejected despite her stellar credentials for the job.128  Perhaps the more 
neutral definition of the term—if there can be such a thing—is the one 
given by Terry Eastland of the Legal Times, who suggested that being 
“borked” occurs when “[y]our opponents attack you on a matter involving 
law and criticize you in terms of policy outcomes . . . . [but y]ou defend 
yourself by discussing the issue in legal jargon.”129  Eastland’s definition is 
helpful because it points to just what felled Bork’s nomination. 
As a prominent conservative who espouses originalism as the basis for 
constitutional interpretation,130 Bork was at the time seen as the vehicle 
through which the conservative movement would consolidate its 
revolutionary designs to dismantle many of the New Deal triumphs that had 
come to define the modern American state.131  Progressives therefore felt so 
sufficiently alarmed about the very real possibility of a Justice Bork on the 
Court that they mobilized to do what had until then been unthinkable: in 
Gary McDowell’s words, “it was the first time that the Senate chose to 
deny confirmation to a nominee whose professional qualifications and legal 
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abilities were never in question.”132  The Bork confirmation mess struck a 
damaging blow to the conservative constitutional movement just as it was 
threatening to reach its ascendancy both in American politics and in law. 
The second occasion where the conservative movement came close to 
consolidating its power is similar to the first insofar as it derives from a 
presidential defeat.  On the heels of the election of George W. Bush as 
president, Jack Balkin posited that new winds would once again fill the 
sails of the conservative revolution, which would finally come to fruition 
with transformative judicial appointments to the Supreme Court.133  He was 
right to put the stakes in these terms because we know that big changes to 
the constitutional landscape in our modern era come in the form of judicial 
opinions issued by revolution-minded judges.134  As Bush settled into 
office and earned reelection, he made two appointments to the Supreme 
Court—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito—neither of 
whom changed the ideological orientation of the bench, given its 
composition at the time.  But then, when the conservative cause needed a 
victory most,135 it was denied to them: in both the 2006 congressional and 
2008 presidential elections, the Republican Party suffered losses, ultimately 
costing the conservative movement a chance to consolidate its 
revolutionary aspirations with one or more transformative appointments to 
the Supreme Court.  We know now that a Democratic president ultimately 
made the two subsequent Supreme Court nominations—one in 2009 and 
another in 2010—that could have otherwise been the privilege of a 
Republican president had the earlier elections gone the other way.  That 
was the conservative movement’s second missed opportunity to move 
closer toward consolidating its constitutional ambitions. 
The conservative constitutional movement now finds itself on the 
verge of another opportunity to transform its powerful movement into a 
constitutional revolution.  We will know very soon whether that movement 
is likely to morph into a revolution or whether it will once again be stopped 
in its tracks, perhaps this time for good.  There are two key events that will 
determine the future of the conservative constitutional movement: first, the 
presidential election of 2012; and second, the fate of the health care law 
passed by congressional Democrats and the President in the spring of 2010. 
Begin first with the coming presidential election.  The current trend of 
opinion polling suggests that the strength of the Republican Party is on the 
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rise according to political analyst Michael Barone.136  When coupled with 
the declining approval ratings recorded for President Barack Obama—two 
years and a month after his inauguration, the President’s approval rating 
has dropped 23%,137 from 67138 to 44%139—this bodes unfavorably for the 
President’s reelection prospects.  But these trends are manifesting 
themselves in real terms well beyond inconsequential polls.  For instance, 
since President Obama’s inauguration, his party has suffered electoral 
defeats, one after the other, in a string of devastating losses at the hands of 
the ascendant conservative movement.  First came the Republican win in 
the special senatorial election in Massachusetts,140 then the Republican 
successes in the Virginia141 and New Jersey gubernatorial elections,142 and 
of course most recently the great conservative triumph in the 2010 midterm 
congressional elections.143  These are troubling times for Democrats 
because they risk losing not only their modest Senate majority but also the 
presidency in 2012144 according to observers.  And with the Senate back in 
Republican hands alongside a Republican presidency, the next Supreme 
Court appointment—which could come during the next four-year 
presidential term—could be the one that gives conservatives an 
unassailable majority on the high court for years to come. 
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The second critical moment that will help determine whether the 
current conservative constitutional movement will lead to the next 
constitutional revolution is the outcome of constitutional challenges to the 
new health care law.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act145 is 
the subject of several lawsuits currently winding their way through federal 
courts across the country.146  The case is expected to reach the Supreme 
Court sometime in the years ahead.  It will be a terribly important case, 
with perhaps more at stake than any other in recent memory because it will 
pit national prerogatives versus state sovereignty and will require the Court 
to determine just how deeply into state boundaries the national government 
can reach.  The health care law has therefore already become a great 
modern constitutional controversy whose resolution will shape American 
politics for years and maybe decades to come.  And with reason because 
“[n]othing less than the ability of the United States to function as a modern 
nation may be at stake,”147 to quote Garrett Epps, a constitutional law 
professor and political columnist for the Atlantic.148 
Here are two big ifs about the constitutional controversy over the 
health care law.  If the law survives these challenges at the Supreme Court, 
we will be able to read the ruling as a death blow to the conservative 
movement.  It will appear to stop what is an increasingly deferential 
judicial posture toward states, it will breathe new life and legitimacy into 
the national government’s regulatory prerogatives, and it will moreover 
reaffirm the federalist basis of the United States with federalism 
conditioned on the supremacy of the center over the periphery. 
But if, however, the Supreme Court rules against the new health care 
law—perhaps a Supreme Court newly emboldened by a new conservative 
appointment—that will mark the consummation of the conservative 
constitutional revolution.  A ruling restricting what Congress can do 
through the Commerce Clause to regulate the health of American citizens 
will stand for three constitutionally conservative revolutionary 
propositions.  First, that the United States consists of fifty sovereign sub-
national entities, each of which is entitled to express its sovereignty free 
from the intrusive regulatory reach of the national government.  Second, 
that the national government enjoys only limited powers that cannot be 
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expanded in a way that divests the Tenth Amendment of its meaning.  And 
third, that the Supreme Court sees itself as the defender of the rights of 
states against the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the national government.  
That will be the message to draw from a Supreme Court judgment that 
gives reason to state challenges against the constitutionality of the health 
care law.  It will mark the culmination of decades of conservative 
constitutional advocacy about the respective roles of federal and state 
governments in the United States.  And the heart of the movement will 
have been the confederalist theory of Justice Thomas, all along pulling the 
Court closer to reclaiming the nation’s confederalist roots. 
CONCLUSION 
All constitutional revolutions face obstacles standing in their way.  
Constitutional revolutions pit challengers and incumbents, the former 
mobilizing to displace the current constitutional orthodoxy and the latter 
marshalling their own forces to stand on guard in defense of the dominant 
constitutional regime of the day.  That is the narrative that runs through the 
constitutional revolutions that have shaped the American constitutional 
edifice and indeed the whole of American constitutional culture.  
America’s second founding and the New Deal Transformation are only two 
of the many vivid illustrations of how America has been shaped and 
reshaped by constitutional conflict and reconciliation.  Today, the United 
States Constitution is the battleground for what may become yet another 
constitutional revolution in American history. 
When the Supreme Court greeted its newest member in the fall of 
1991, the conservative movement was already building momentum toward 
achieving ascendancy in both American law and politics.  But Justice 
Thomas’s confirmation battle and its aftermath coincided with the onset of 
even greater political changes in American constitutional politics.149  
Shortly after Justice Thomas’s installation, the Court issued the first in a 
string of conservative judgments reviving Tenth Amendment limits on the 
central government and reinforcing the boundary separating states from the 
national capital.150  Ronald Reagan had been elected, reelected, and later 
ceded the reins to his Vice President, George H.W. Bush who, like Reagan, 
successfully nominated a justice to the Supreme Court.  Edward Meese 
had, at the time, given what has since become a landmark speech, 
celebrated in some circles but influential in all, calling on courts to use 
originalist interpretative techniques and proclaiming that “an activist 
jurisprudence, one which anchors the Constitution only in the consciences 
of jurists, is a chameleon jurisprudence, changing color and form in each 
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era.”151  Soon thereafter, Republicans scored a historic victory in the 1994 
midterm congressional elections, securing majorities in both houses of 
Congress—a remarkable feat by modern conservative standards.152 
The conservative movement has since come closer and closer to 
achieving the transformative constitutional change it longs for.  The 
movement has survived some demoralizing defeats along the way, but 
nothing yet destructive enough to extinguish it.  Whether the movement 
becomes a constitutional revolution, however, remains uncertain—and this 
will remain unknown until American constitutional politics resolves two 
outstanding questions: who will win the 2012 presidential election, and 
how will the Supreme Court rule on the new health care law? 
But amid these doubts about the future course of American 
constitutional law, two things remain certain.  First, Justice Thomas will 
continue to interpret the United States Constitution in confederalist terms, 
concerned first, and above all, with promoting state supremacy, protecting 
state sovereignty, and neutralizing the concerns that give him and others 
reason to be suspicious of the power-arrogating tendencies of the national 
government.  Justice Thomas is a jurist of principle who heeds only what 
he believes to be right, not what he regards as expedient.  And for him, 
what is right as a matter of constitutional law and founding history is to 
reclaim America’s confederalist roots. 
The second thing we can be sure of is the continuing influence of 
Justice Thomas.  Even if the current conservative movement fails to 
consummate its revolutionary aspirations, there will nevertheless remain 
hope for the movement’s revival sometime in the future because Justice 
Thomas is not expected to retire anytime soon.  He only recently entered 
his 60s.153  He could very well remain on the bench for the next two to 
three decades.  We could see another conservative movement spring 
between now and then.  And with Justice Thomas still likely to be on the 
bench when it does, the next conservative movement may very well be the 
one that becomes the next constitutional revolution. 
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